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IN SEARCH OF A GENERAL APPROACH TO
LEGAL ANALYSIS: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
Neil Komesar*
The law most relevant to the lawyer is the law of the future legal decisions that the lawyer will be asked to affect or predict. Like
all historical phenomena, past decisions and other raw material yield
relevant insights about the future only if they can be ordered systematically. Such an ordering is becoming increasingly difficult in a
world where the volume of legal decisions, variety of legal decision
makers, and complexity of social issues are constantly expanding. It
is, therefore, important to develop a basic set of relatively simple
general questions that can yield useful insights about the law.
This Article is an attempt to aid in the construction of such a
general approach to legal analysis. Its central thesis is that all legal
decisions share a fundamental feature that should be a basic building block for any general analytic approach: they all involve a
choice among imperfect alternative decision-making institutions. In
all cases, legal decision makers must consider the relative merits or
attributes of the alternative institutions. The analyst of legal decisions, therefore, should adopt a "comparative institutional" approach, which can be simply stated as follows: the determinants of
legal decisions can best be analyzed when legal decision makers are
viewed as though they were concerned with choosing the best, or
least imperfect, institution to implement a given societal goal.
It is not my thesis that institutional comparison is the only feature of legal decisions, but rather that it is an important feature that
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B. 1963, A.M. 1964, J.D.
1967, Ph.D. 1973, University of Chicago. - Ed.
I am grateful to the many people who read and co=ented on various drafts of this Article.
Howard Erlanger, Martha Fineman, Ted Finman, Ted Schneyer and David Trubek commented on all or part of earlier versions. Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock, and Richard Posner co=ented on later drafts.
I owe a special debt to those who read and co=ented on several drafts - David Goldberger, Joel Handler, Willard Hurst, Paul Langer, Tom Palay, Shelley Safer, Mark Tushnet,
and Bill Whitford.
These readers brought diverse and useful outlooks to their reading. They forced me to
sharpen the thinking and the exposition. The end product was improved by their efforts.
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may offer significant insights into all legal issues. As such, it provides a useful and relatively simple way to organize analysis.
Another general approach to legal analysis has evolved over the
last decade. Described as "the new law and economics," "the positive economic analysis of law," or "the economic approach," 1 it argues that legal decision makers pursue an efficient allocation of
resources. Although the economic approach has been criticized, this
criticism is but part of a larger and growing attention and interest.
The attention is understandable because the approach promises and
often delivers useful or at least provocative insights into a wide range
of legal issues.
As the major existing general approach to legal analysis, the economic approach establishes a valuable context in which to explore
the comparative institutional approach. Despite its contributions,
the ability of the economic approach to provide insights about the
determinants of legal decisions is limited. There are two distinct
problems with this prevailing approach.
First, it is unclear whether the analytic concern of the economic
approach is with the determinants or the effects of legal decisions.
This ambivalence about analytic purpose has produced sweeping
claims that the common-law judiciary tends to produce results that
are allocatively efficient, while the legislature does not. These claims
reveal important analytic flaws, are unnecessary if one is concerned
I. The term "economic approach" will be used throughout the article to refer to this positive legal analysis oflaw that has employed the tools of economic analysis. The major proponent of this economic approach is Professor Richard A. Posner. He has contributed
substantially to the literature himself, and has summarized the work of others in his basic text,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS], and
survey articles, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Uses and Abuses] and The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEXAS L. REV.
757 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Approach].
In this Article, Professor Posner's discussions will often be taken to represent the "economic approach" - positive economic analysis of legal rules and decisions. As Professor Posner is not the only contributor, the dominant use of his analysis is a simplification.
This simplifying choice is made more credible by Professor Posner's recognized position
and his continuous attempts to organize and synthesize work in the area. The concern here is
with the "economic approach" as a general mode of casting legal analysis. The Article is not
meant as a review of all of the literature in the area.
It is important to distinguish between the positive and normative economic analysis oflaw.
Only the former is considered here. There are many legal scholars who have used economic
analysis to evaluate legal rules and institutions. A dominant figure here is Professor Guido
Calabresi whose early work on rules of liability contributed to the extension of economic analysis to law. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
The importance of institutional comparison and the failure to integrate it adequately into
economic analysis in general are themes manifested in the works of several economists; most
dominantly the works of Ronald Coase. Professor Coase has continuously revealed a creative
perception of the basic institutional implications in economic analysis. See, e.g., Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960).
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with the determinants of legal decisions, and create confusion about
the role of economic efficiency. This distinction between legal analysis of the determinants and effects of decisions, and the problems
caused by the failure of the proponents of the economic approach to
limit their discussion to determinants, are discussed in Part I.
Second, and most important for this Article, when those employing the economic approach do search for the determinants of legal
decisions, they reveal a distinct institutional myopia. The approach
generally considers variation in the attributes of only one institution
- the market. This approach is basically incomplete. If societal
decisions are allocated to or away from the market, they are taken
from or given to some other institutional alternative. A number of
institutions are available and the adequacy of each of these institutions varies with the legal setting. Thus it is not enough to establish
that in a given setting the market would not perform perfectly; one
must also compare the market's performance with that of the available alternative decision-making institutions. Part II compares the
economic and comparative institutional approaches in several contexts: property rights and remedies, the role of custom and penal
statutes in the determination of tort liability, and the constitutional
law issue of economic due process, among others.
A basic theme underlies much of this Article: all human institutions are substantially imperfect. This theme plays many roles.
First, it provides the intuitive basis for the analytic approach suggested here. Judicial decision making is conceived directly in terms
of a search among imperfect institutions. Indeed, the "searcher" the common law or constitutional law judge - is perceived as aware
of his or her own imperfections. Judicial decision making is a search
in substantial uncertainty or ignorance rather than a confident
march toward some perceived truth. Second, the failure adequately
to consider institutional imperfection explains most of the difficulties
with the economic approach. That approach has failed to provide a
systematic explanatory role to variations in the attributes of
nonmarket institutions. In addition, in its sweeping assertions about
the outputs or effects of large institutions such as the legislature and
the judiciary, it has confused the existence of institutional imperfection with the establishment of institutional failure.
Another form of imperfection - the imperfection of legal analysis - also forms a critical backdrop to this Article. The tools oflegal
· analysis are primitive,2 and the task of legal analysis is difficult. The
2. Komesar, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction: A Comment,
22 J. L. & ECON. 387, 387-88 (1980).
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basic characteristics of this Article are acceptable only in such a setting. This Article is exploratory and speculative. The suggested institutionally based analysis has been tested only in its author's
experience and intuition, and the examples provided are illustrative
rather than determinative.
In addition, although the analysis is intended to be general in the
sense that it is applicable potentially in all areas of the law, it is partial in the sense that it explicitly analyzes only the institutional
choice. It leaves the choice of societal goal external or exogenous to
the analysis. This decision to emphasize the choice of institutions
rather than the choice of goals may appear odd in a field that has
lavished so much attention on debates about such alternative goals
as individual liberty, equality of treatment, equity in distribution,
and efficient allocation of resources. But it is consistent with the purpose of the Article, which is to understand the determinants of individual legal decisions, and with the author's perception that a
significant part of what has traditionally been articulated as values
and goals really represents unarticulated evaluations of institutional
capacities and failings.
The primitive state of legal analysis also demands restraint and
care in criticism. In a world in which the best tools will likely always
be highly imperfect, revelation of imperfection is trivial. Efforts in
the struggle to improve legal or social analysis can hardly be judged
on their ability to capture perfectly the truth or to meet some ideal
standards of scientific testing. Only a criticism which offers an available alternative or which at least reflects an understanding of the real
state of the art is useful.
This Article criticizes the economic approach - based on its lack
of a clear focus on institutional factors. The positive economic analysis of law is the target of criticism because it is the most productive
existing approach. This Article attempts not only to point up the
imperfections in the economic approach but also to suggest an alternative mode of analysis and its advantages.
I.

THE ALTERNATIVE PURPOSES OF LEGAL ANALYSIS AND THE
ROLE OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

This Article attempts to construct a general approach to legal
analysis, which is here taken to mean the identification of those factors or variables that explain past and predict future legal decisions
- the determinants of legal decisions. This is one among many
valid analytic purposes. This concern for the identification of deter-
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minants is shared by the economic approach. The second part of this
Article compares the analysis of determinants by the economic and
comparative institutional approaches. However, apparently without
realizing the distinction, the proponents of the economic approach
have merged the analysis of the determinants of legal decisions with
the analysis of the efects of legal decisions. This merger has been
associated with sweeping claims about the efficiency of large institutional aggregates. These claims about effect reveal inadequate comparative institutional analysis and, more important, are irrelevant to
an analysis concerned with determinants. This failure to distinguish
analytic goals and the ensuing claims have confused the role of economic efficiency in the analysis of legal decisions. While economic
efficiency is not irrelevant, its role must be more carefully circumscribed if it is to aid the analyst concerned with the determinants of
legal decisions. This part of the Article considers the distinctions between various goals oflegal analysis, the efficiency claims of the economic approach and their unfortunate consequences, and the
potential role for an economic efficiency construct in the analysis of
determinants.
A.

Goals of Legal Analysis

Legal analysis has four general concerns: the articulated rationales of legal decisions, the determinants of legal decisions, the effects of legal decisions, and the evaluation of legal decisions. It is
not uncommon to confuse and merge several of these concerns. This
is especially likely when the distinction between "positive" and "normative" analysis is employed, as it is in the economic approach.
"Normative" analysis - what the law ought to be - is the fourth
concern, the evaluative concern. But "positive" analysis - what the
law is - can be viewed as any of the first three. The first two - the
rationales and the determinants - are the central concerns of the
lawyer as practitioner. This Article emphasizes the search for determinants rather than rationales because an ability to discern these determinants seems the most important aspect of the lawyer's craft. It
may be important to know how to translate one's message into the
form preferred by the decision maker. But it would appear far more
important to know what factors when presented might actually vary
the decision.
The breadth of the law makes it difficult to discover the determinants of legal decisions, and neither rationales nor effects offer substantial guidance. Traditional legal analysis teaches that the reasons
articulated by the decision maker are seldom sufficient - and are
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sometimes irrelevant - as indicators of the actual determinants of
decisions. Judicial opinions are more often observations to be explained than sources of explanation. They yield insights only to one
who can approach them systematically. Similarly, although effects
can sometimes indicate determinants, there are several basic
problems with their use for that purpose. First, it is difficult to isolate the effects of a legal decision. Second, a decision may have
many effects, even if the analyst considers only the most immediate
or proximate. The question then becomes which of these effects
reveals the concerns of the decision maker and which does not.
Third, given the complexity of society and the interaction of so many
societal decisions and decision makers, the correlation between intent and effect may be extremely low.
The differences between the three concerns of positive legal analysis can perhaps best be seen in a simple example of positive analysis
in a nonlegal setting: a study of pool playing. Presumably a physicist, when asked to examine pool playing, would employ something
akin to vector analysis, which deals with angles and forces. The
physicist might be asked whether the players will get the ball in the
hole (an "effect" question), or how the players would explain their
behavior (a "rationale" question). Alternatively, the physicist might
be asked to study the determinants of the pool players' decisions.
Thus, we might want to know what the players would do if we
moved the cue ball or the target ball farther apart or put them at
different angles in relation to the hole. Would the players use more
force or less, change the angle of their shot, or move themselves
around the table?
The role and efficacy of the analytical construct - vector analysis - might vary with the question asked. Even if the construct
worked well to describe the behavior of a player, it might not describe well the explanation offered by the player. Physicists talk in
scientific terms; pool players may not. Similarly, the construct might
work well to describe the behavior of both the effective and ineffective (albeit not totally random) player.
The pool playing example points out another subtle but important point. The argument that pool players behave as though they
were using the precepts of vector analysis does not mean that they
actually use those precepts. Their own intuitions and internal ruminations may relate only indirectly to a straightforward vector analysis. The scientific framework is a tool used by outside observers in this example, physicists - to organize their observations and in
tum. to understand and predict the players' behavior.
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The analysis of determinants that is central to this Article is thus
distinct from an analysis of either rationales or effects. Blurring
these distinctions may cause unfortunate analytic problems. This
conclusion forms the basis for the next section's analysis of the roles
of determinants and effects in the economic approach.
B. Efficiency Effects and the Economic Approach

Professor Richard Posner, one of the leading advocates of the
economic approach, has cast his most recent articulation of that approach in terms of the efects of broadly defined legal institutions:
Scholars engaged in this branch of the positive economic analysis of
law have advanced the hypothesis that rules, procedures, and institutions of the common or judge-made law - in sharp contrast to much
legislative and constitutional rulemaking - promote efficiency. The
hypothesis is not that the common law does or could perfectly duplicate the results of competitive markets; it is that, within the limits of
administrative feasibility, the law brings the economic system closer to
producing the results that effective competition - a free market operating without significant extemality, monopoly, or information
problems - would produce.3

This articulation is different from many of his previous general definitions, which were cast in terms of determinants .4 Professor Frank
Michelman, whose commentary appeared along with Professor Posner's recent summary of the economic approach, "corrected" the effects articulation to one consistent with determinants. 5 However, it
is not clear that the recent variant is inadvertent. At other points,
assertions about effects have appeared in general discussions of the
economic approach. 6 These assertions have been accompanied by
3. Uses and Abuses, supra note 1, at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).
4. In his other earlier summary of the economic approach to law he employed the following articulation of the positive economic analysis of the law:
A second important finding emerging from the recent law and economics research is that
the legal system itself - its doctrines, procedures, and institutions - has been strongly
influenced by a concern (more often implicit than explicit) with promoting economic efficiency. The rules assigning property rights and determining liability, the procedures for
resolving legal disputes, the constraints imposed on law enforcers, methods of computing
damages and determining the availability of injunctive relief -these and other important
elements of the legal system can best be understood as attempts, though rarely acknowledged as such, to promote an efficient allocation of resources.
Approach, supra note 1, at 763-64 (footnotes omitted).
S. Even here, I daresay Posner misdescribes his own theory by calling it "the hypothesis
that common law rules and institutions tend to promote economic efficiency." A more
accurate statement of the hypothesis, I believe, would be that the rules, taken as a whole,
tend to look as though they were chosen with a view to maximizing social wealth (economic output as measured by price) by judges subscribing to a certain set of
("microeconomic") theoretical principles.
Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses ofEconomics in Law, 46 U. CHI, L. Rev.
306, 308 (1979) (footnote omitted).
6. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 404.
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some general theorizing about legislatures and courts.7 In tum, both
these assertions and this theorizing have been reflected in attempts to
explain the alleged tendency toward efficiency without recourse to
the actions of the judicial decision maker. 8
This section has two theses. It argues first that the broad assertions about effects are strained and unnecessary for an analysis concerned with determinants. It also argues that the failure to
concentrate on the judicial decision maker leads to "evolutionary''
theories which are largely irrelevant to an analysis of the determinants of decisions useful to lawyers.
1. Institutional Efficiency

The proponents of the economic approach assert that existing
studies establish, or at least tend to establish, that the common law
promotes efficiency while legislative and constitutional rule making
do not. Although the works referred to provide valuable insights
about the legislative and judicial processes, they do not support the
sweeping propositions for which they are cited.
The works that allegedly prove that the legislative process
reduces efficiency establish, 9 at most, two propositions:
(1) The actors in the legislative process (legislators, voters, administrators, lobbyists, etc.) are not motivated by and do not intend to promote the public interest in general and economic efficiency in
particular (hereinafter the "private interest" proposition).
(2) The political process is distorted by special interests; because a
perfect process would not have produced all of the regulations actually
producecj, the removal of the specific regulations in question would
increase economic efficiency (hereinafter the "imperfect process" proposition).

The proponents of the economic approach extrapolate from these
propositions to their assertions about institutional efficiency.
The "private interest" proposition, however, is largely irrelevant
to a proof of inefficiency. It might be relevant as a refutation of the
hypothesis that the legislature intends to operate in the interest of the
public - an insight perhaps useful in some settings. But it is hardly
evidence that the aggregate e_ffect of the legislative process is the reduction of efficiency.
7. Id at 404-17.
8. See generally Goodman, An Economic Theory of Evaluation

of the Common Law, 7 J.
of

LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Sel~ction
Efficient Rules,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Priest, Selective Characteristics Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1980); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).

of

9. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 404 n.l.
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This "private interest" proposition not only fails to indict the results of the legislative process, but also applies with equal force to
the market. If proof that private interests are at work were sufficient
to establish inefficiency, the market would be proved a priori inefficient. The notion of the "invisible hand" and its ability to tum private vice into public virtue is the core of economic analysis. Market
actors (buyers, sellers, producers, consumers, etc.) do not seek to promote the public interest or economic efficiency. They do not care
whether society's resources are well-allocated. They presumably
care about lining their own pockets. The motivation of the legislative
actors has been described as the unprincipled redistribution of income. But that is precisely the motivation postulated by economics
for market actors. Such a motivation does not mean the aggregate
ejfect of either institution is economically inefficient. In a world of
complex interactions among large populations, the establishment of
tainted motives, whether by Marxists, mercantilists, or free marketeers does not establish the existence of tainted aggregate outcomes. 10
This brings us to the "imperfect process" proposition. It can be
argued plausibly on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the
legislative process is not only subject to private interest motives on
the individual level, but is also subject to a skewed representation of
interests on the aggregate level. One prevailing economic theory of
regulation emphasizes the attempts by special interest groups to extract redistributive benefits from the political process. 11 Because the
effectiveness of these groups is increased by their ability to pool
funds and organize efforts, concentrated interests may have a disproportionate influence on the legislative process. Thus, the process of
political "competition" may not perfectly represent intensity of preference and, therefore, may produce imperfect allocative results. Although the evidence is not conclusive, there is strong support for the
10. The pluralist theories of political science are based upon a notion of competition
among political positions based on self-interest. Under the correct conditions, such a system
can produce ideal allocations. That such conditions do not exist is the subject of the substantial criticism of a pluralist theory as normative analysis. A leading work in this connection is
T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). Lowi criticized the pluralist approach as normative
theory on the same basis as the criticism of laissez-faire economics as normative theory. He
notes the validity of the theory on a positive or descriptive basis, but rejects its assumptions for
ideology.
The pluralist analysis and its criticism as a perception of reality parallel the analysis of
market behavior and its criticism. There is no a priori manner of determining that the deviations from ideal conditions (imperfections) in one context are greater than in the other. Sensitive normative or positive theory would likely be forced to compare the institutions in less
sweeping contexts and in terms of their relative imperfections.
ll. See generally, Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ef Regulation, 19 J. L, &
EcoN. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory efEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MANAGE·
MENT SCI. 3 (1971).
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hypothesis that the legislative process is highly imperfect in its allocation of society's resources.
But there is a major difference between "imperfection" and
"inefficiency." Every human institution is imperfect. The market is
highly imperfect, and its imperfection is one justification for the
existence of legislatures and other political processes. Majority voting is a means of determining public desires in the context of public
goods problems - instances in which the market mechanism will
yield imperfect indications of intensity. Now it appears that the "replacement" for the market - the political process - is also imperfect. The majoritarian process can yield imperfect indications of
public desires. But imperfection alone does not imply inefficiency.
An institution is inefficient only when it functions less perfectly than
an alternative available institution.
Since the judicial process and the market are also substantially
imperfect, 12 there are no a priori grounds for asserting that the imperfections in one massive institutional configuration such as the
market or the judiciary are less than those in another such as the
legislature. Only examination of relative imperfections - a comparative institutional analysis of attributes - can yield valuable insights
about efficiency.
Nor is the inefficiency of the legislative process as a whole established by empirical studies of selected outputs. The studies cited
evince that specific outcomes of the studied legislative and administrative processes are inefficient, in the sense that it would be efficient
to eliminate the law in question. But these studies examine a meager
12. The judicial process shares with the legislature the problem of concentrated interests.
When a large social loss is dispersed over many unrela'ted interests, as may be the case for
many consumer and pollution problems, see text at notes 27-28 iefra, the difficulties of organizing and funding litigation may prevent the potential plaintiffs from seeking redress. If
the same amount of injury is inflicted on a concentrated interest, it can more easily organize
and fund litigation than the dispersed group could have. To the extent that litigation outlays
affect the probability of success, the dispersed interest will be less likely to succeed, whatever
the merits of its claim. This imperfection in the judicial setting may impair efficiency as much
as does its counterpart in the legislative process.
There are reforms in the judicial process - such as class actions - that try to correct this
problem. Analogous reforms - such as controls on lobbying or easier public access to information - also appear in the legislative setting. There are no grounds to assume that these
legislative reforms are any less likely to be successful than the reforms in the judicial process.
The dispersed interest problem can also be associated with market imperfections. The
market is affected only when people enter into transactions, just as the political process is
affected only when people lobby or vote. Where an individual's interest is small, transaction
costs - such as the acquisition of information - may discourage manifestation of demand
which though small per capita, may be large in the aggregate.
The dispersed interest problem shows that there can be parallel imperfections across institutions. This seems to be a potentially valuable subject for inquiry, one that would aid and be
aided by comparative institutional analysis.
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and hardly random sample of the output of the legislative process.
One observer, commenting on these same studies as representative
even of economic regulation - let alone of legislation as a whole,
stated:
The empirical research has not been systematic. The researcher does
not draw a random sample of, say, the economic legislation passed in
the last ten years and ask how much of that legislation can be explained by the economic theory of regulation. Instead, he picks the
cases that seem from a distance to support the theory and seeks to determine whether that initial impression was correct. I am not criticizing these studies. Had they shown that trucking, and airline, and
railroad regulation could not be explained by reference to the operation of interest groups, the significance for scholarship would have
been immense. But even a lengthy series of case studies cannot provide much support for the economic theory of regulation, given that
the industries studies do not appear to be - and were not selected as
- typical and that apparent counterexamples abound. 13

The commentator was Professor Posner. If the sample is inadequate
to establish that economic regulation is governed by a given model
of legislative behavior - an express purpose of many of the studies,
it is even more clearly inadequate to show that all legislative output
(of which economic regulation is a small and not necessarily representative subset) reduces efficiency. It is difficult for an economist to
determine whether any specific law, rule, tax, or other societal decision increases or decreases efficiency. The task of determining how
an entire institution affects efficiency is awesome.
Even if the evidence established a tendency to overregulate commercial activity and indicated that the removal of certain regulations
would increase efficiency, only imperfection would be established
unless there was a feasibJe institutional arrangement that would
achieve a better result. Two possible "better'' mechanisms are imaginable: either the federal judiciary could review legislation to decide
whether it is efficient, or we could eliminate all economic regulation.
The first alternative is illustrated by the era in which the federal
courts invalidated regulations under the banner of economic due
process; this is discussed in Part II. The federal judiciary is hardly a
perfect screener of inefficient legislation, and active judicial review
of regulation is not obviously superior to the present system. What
about eliminating all regulation of trade or commercial activity?
Even assuming that one could determine where such regulation began and other legislation stopped, the studies viewed in their most
13. Posner, Theories ofEconomic Regulation, 5
353 (1974) (footnote omitted).

BELL

J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 335,
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favorable light do not clearly indicate that "no regulation" - reliance on the imperfect market - is superior to the present system reliance on the imperfect legislative process. 14
We can now turn to the other half of the "effects" assertions the theory that the "common law" promotes efficiency. The evidence for this theory is no stronger than the evidence on the inefficiency of the legislature. The studies cited here provide valuable
insights into various rules oflaw. 15 They are the core of the attempts
to analyze the determinants of legal decisions.
However, when cited as indicative of the effects of the commonlaw process, they are highly questionable sources. They do not establish that a given area oflaw is efficient, or tends toward efficiency.
They establish that, given a plausible set of institutional assumptions - not always articulated - the legal decisions in question
could be efficient. That outcome could provide evidence of efficiency were it not apparent that the number of plausible institutional
assumptions is enormous. In each instance, one could construct a set
of assumptions that would argue that the opposite rule or decision is
efficient. 16 There are so many such potential failures in any setting
that without substantial empirical effort one could not designate any
one as the single dominant force, the correction of which would
14. Airline regulation is a frequent subject of the literature. But even if a form of legislation is inefficient (in the sense that eliminating the legislation would improve resource allocation), this does not establish that the legislative process in general tends toward or away from
efficiency. It is interesting, however, that this form of regulation is on its way out, and that the
institutional source of this alleged move toward efficiency has been the legislature itself. Is this
evidence that the legislative process tends toward efficiency?
IS. See Uses and Abuses, supra note I, at 290 nn.33-41, and sources cited therein.,
16. The argument here is not that it is impossible to establish efficiency by empirical evidence. It certainly is not that the attempt should not be made. Many of the works cited by
Professor Posner are creative and able attempts at empiricism.
The problem lies in the impression created that any of these studies has established that the
given area of law is efficient or tends toward efficiency. Such an impression is not consistent
with either the state of the art or the complexity of the context. The difficulty of maintaining
such a claim is captured in the following quote from Milton Friedman's article on positive
economics:
Evidence cast up by experience is abundant and frequently as conclusive as that from
contrived experiments. . . . But such evidence is far more difficult to interpret. It is frequently complex and always indirect and incomplete. Its collection is often arduous, and
its interpretation generally requires subtle analysis and involved chains of reasoning,
which seldom carry real conviction. The denial to economics of the dramatic and direct
evidence of the "crucial" experiment does hinder the adequate testing of hypotheses; but
this is much less significant than the difficulty it places in the way of achieving a reasonably prompt and wide consensus on the conclusions justified by the available evidence.
M. FRIEDMAN, 17,e Methodology ofPositive Economics, in EsSAYS IN POSITIVE EcoNOMICS 1011 (1953).
The data and methods referred to by Friedman are generally substantially better than that
available to those who test the hypotheses of legal analysis. For a recent and extensive discussion of the difficulties of establishing the efficiency of the common law, see Kornhauser, A
Guide to the Perplexed Claims ofEfficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. R.E.v. 591; 610-21 (1980).
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move the economy toward efficiency. 17 The common-law courts
may appear to react to perceived market imperfections; they may
operate as though they were concerned with achieving economic efficiency. But this does not mean that the common law has actually
correctly identified the market imperfections that if corrected would
promote efficiency.
2. Evolutionary Processes
Whether alternative institutions actually achieve efficient results
is not highly relevant to an analysis of determinants, but the
mechanics of the decision-making process can be. Recent descriptions of the economic approach no longer speak in terms of judicial
behavior. 18 A number of scholars now attempt to explain the alleged
tendency toward efficiency in a manner that divorces it from the concerns or tendencies of judges. While these "evolutionary" theories
have been debated on several grounds, 19 there are two unnoticed
features that would severely constrain their value in legal analysis.
First, the evolutionary theories do not offer separate evidence
that the common law tends toward efficiency. They assume the results discussed previously and attempt to explain them. These theories, which all depend upon the self-interested incentives of members
of society to pursue litigation, attempt to show that, under varying
conditions, inefficient rules
generate more cases, or more investment in cases than will efficient rules. Although the analyses are
interesting and creative, the same arguments could be made about

will

17. The analysis of the Boomer case that appears later in this Article shows that the positions of both the dissent and the majority are consistent with a concern for and the potential
achievement of efficiency.
Posner,A Theory ofNegligence, l J. LEGAL Snm. 29 (1972), argues strongly that the negligence rules that he studied were consistent with efficiency. But elsewhere Professor Posner
notes many serious imperfections in the torts process. For example, he argues that the existence ofliability insurance can provide a pervasive block on the receipt of the signal sent by the
negligence system. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 154. When one factors in these
and other institutional problems, it is not persuasive that the law of negligence discussed by
Posner actually moves the system toward efficiency.
18. See text at note 3 supra.
19. The evolutionary metaphor is employed by one of the proponents of this theory, Professor Paul Rubin: "In short, the efficient rule situation noted by Posner is due to an evolutionary mechanism whose direction proceeds from the utility maximizing decisions of
disputants rather than the wisdom of judges." Rubin, supra note 8, at 51. Rubin has been
joined by George Priest and John Goodman, see note 8 supra, in the pursuit of an evolutionary theory that divorces the efficiency of the common law from the attributes of the commonlaw decision maker. These three treatments take different approaches to the theory. They
have been critical of each other's approach, and their analyses have been criticized by scholars
outside the evolutionary school. See Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL Snm. 139 (1980); Landes & Posner, Adjudicatio11 as a
Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL Snm. 235 (1957). There is little purpose in rehashing the arguments
here.
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the legislative process. Inefficient legislation produces more harm
among the populace and, therefore, should produce more efforts to
affect legislation - lobbying, campaigning, graft, etc. On this level
of generality, one could as easily postulate conditions under which
these efforts would drive the legislative process toward efficiency.
Thus, these studies provide no additional reason to suppose that the
common law is more or less efficient than any other mode of legal
decision making.
Second, and most important, if the evolutionary theorists are correct, and positive theory is divorced from the judicial decision making process, their analysis is largely irrelevant to practitioners. If
evolution occurs, it does so over a long period and a large number of
cases. Such a process - even if it did evolve "efficient" rules would hardly be relevant to anyone who wished to predict a given
case or the evolution of a given area of law within a period that is
relevant to most legal clients. The relevance of the theory to a legal
analyst who wishes to alter or affect the decision is, by definition,
nonexistent. The process is inexorable. Because it is not the product
of the actions of the decision maker, it is immune to efforts by individual advocates. This difficulty with the evolutionary approach
again reveals the need for the legal analyst to designate carefully his
or her analytic purpose.
C.

The Role of a Mod!fied Efficiency Hypothesis

It is important to avoid the conclusion that economic efficiency
has no place in an analysis of the determinants of legal decisions. I
have argued that sweeping claims about the efficiency of alternative
institutions disserve an analy~t who is concerned with determinants.
But if the analyst employs economic efficiency to approximate a goal
that institutional decision makers attempt to promote, the construct
can be useful. This section attempts to clarify the nature of an analysis in which such an efficiency construct could be used, and to find an
intuitive connection between the concerns of judges and something
so seemingly sterile as economic efficiency. 20
A positive analysis that employs the construct does not assume
that judges are actually concerned with economic efficiency. It asserts rather that they act as though they were concerned with it. That
nuance provides a significant change that is reflected in the positive
20. Professor Frank Michelman, a critical and careful observer of the economic approach,
has argued that there must be some normative basis to support the notion that economic efficiency is a postulated goal ofjudges. He wishes some intuitive basis to believe that judges seek
to achieve economic efficiency. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 311-12.
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analysis of pool playing discussed previously. 21 Presumably, pool
players are not interested in successful vector analysis, good vector
analysis, or any kind of vector analysis at all. They are interested in
getting the ball in the pocket. Vector analysis is a method for observers to trace and predict the behavior of pool players. The assumptions, technical constraints, and mathematical trappings of vector
analysis are irrelevant to pool players. The constructs do not affect
the players' behavior; they are used by others to understand and interpret it.
Similarly, jurists need not have direct knowledge of or concern
about the concepts and tools of economic analysis. Their minds are
not filled with mathematical equations from Hick's appendix, Samuelson's dissertation, or the Theory of the Second Best. But we need
only postulate that they are interested in something that can be described roughly from the outside as economic efficiency. Economic
efficiency, like vector analysis, is a method for an analyst to understand observed behavior - in this instance, the behavior of judges. 22
Given that the concepts of economic efficiency are merely external approximations of internal goals or intuitions, what could those
goals or intuitions be? Here, of course, the process is highly speculative. "Economic efficiency" might describe a range of goals that do
not actually resemble it, but the combination of which produces responses similar in external confirmation. There would be no connection between the intuitions of those who built the efficiency
constructs and the intuition of the judges whose behavior is analyzed.
Economic efficiency could also represent judicial intuitions more
closely related to its basic features. These intuitions could have two
related strands: (1) that conflicts over the distribution of scarce resources should be resolved by reference to the needs or values of the
members of society, and (2) that the weight assigned to these values
or needs should reflect the intensity of the feelings of these individuals. These principles would not be universally acceptable, nor would
they represent all of a decision maker's goals, but they are consistent
21. See text preceding note 3 supra.
22. This distinction can be overlooked even by sophisticated co=entators. In a recent
critique of the economic approach, Professor Lewis Kornhauser briefly discusses Professor
Michelman's (see note 5 supra) determinants translation of the economic approach. Professor
Kornhauser criticizes this variant because he does not believe that judges use economic tools
and that if they did, it would be reflected in the language of their written opinions. Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 620. Such criticism misunderstands the role of the construct in an
analysis of determinants. The hypothesis does not claim that judges employ economic tools. It
argues that their behavior can be described as though they employed those tools. The economics is employed by the observer, not the judge.
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with generally acceptable intuitions. The desires and values of people are attractive building blocks for a social system, and it seems
plausible that societal decision makers wish to respect these desires
and values.23
Thus, the construct of economic efficiency may be used to approximate one of the societal goals employed in a comparative institutional framework. Whether the construct of economic efficiency
with all its trappings is the best available mode of this approximation
is not obvious. The answer lies in the available alternative constructs and their track records. Although the economic approach has
made excessive claims in the name of efficiency, the approach has
sometimes productively analyzed the determinants oflegal decisions.
It thus seems plausible that a more carefully drawn and employed
concept of economic efficiency can contribute to a comparative institutional approach.
II.

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON

With a better sense of the distinctions among analytical purposes
and of the place of a confined efficiency construct, we can tum to the
central concern of this Article - the role of institutional comparison
in legal analysis.
It is the thesis of this section that, even if one accepts the basic
argument of the economic approach that economic efficiency is the
goal or logic of the law, far more insight about the determinants of
legal decisions will be gained from an analysis which explicitly focuses on the comparison of institutions.24 The economic approach
tends to focus on the attributes of only one institution - the market.
23. Although economic efficiency can be viewed as a conceptual apparatus capable of
externally observing behavior based on this concern, it contains features that may seem to
diminish its appeal. The most critiqued feature is the ''willingness-to-pay" concept. See
Michelman, supra note 5, at 311. See generally Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can
Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 671, 677-81 (1980). Thus, efficiency is
often defined as a situation in which goods go to those who value them the most - that is,
those who would pay the most for them. However, this reflects ability to pay. It suppresses
distributional questions, and can be seen as favoring the wealthy, whose preferences receive
greater weight This presents troubling questions for resource allocation efficiency as a normative principle. Professor Posner has recently made an argument for ''wealth maximization" as
a normative principle. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL Sruo.
103 (1979). This proposition has been criticized extensively. It received the critical attention
of a wide range of scholars in a recent symposium. See 8 HOFSTRA L. R.Ev. 485-770 (1980).
However, the existence of this efficiency construct should not be so troubling in a positive
theory.
24. This section accepts the definition of resource allocation or economic efficiency employed by the economic approach: efficiency is the closest attainable approximation of the
outcome of the perfectly functioning market. See text at note 3 supra. The term presupposes a
given income distribution. It defines the value of resources to be the amount that individuals
are willing to pay for them.
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This focus reduces the potential coverage of legal issues and systematically suppresses a range of determinants which are as plausibly
valuable as those which the economic approach emphasizes.
This section compares the comparative institutional and economic approaches in a number of contexts. It first considers the relative abilities of the two approaches to understand legal rules and
decisions where the market is arguably an important institutional alternative. This area should be the strength of the economic approach. The second part of the section then considers areas of the
law in which the market is not clearly an important institution.
A.

The Judiciary Versus the Market

In order to see the implicit institutional focus of the economic
approach and some of the advantages of the comparative institutional approach, let us tum to some passages from the leading treatise on the economic analysis of law, Professor Posner's Economic
Analysis ofLaw. This section discusses two applications of the economic approach. The first involves the general question of property
law remedies; the second involves the narrower issue of the role of
custom in tort liability. In both instances, the economic approach
has offered some useful insights. But, in both areas, it is unduly
hampered by its consideration of only one institution.
1.

Property Rules and Remedies

In his analysis of the law of trespass, Professor Posner employs
the example of one neighbor attempting to use the garage of another
without permission. If the owner of the garage seeks redress, the
courts generally will not listen to a defense by the neighbor that his
or her use is more valuable, and they will usually enjoin future trespasses. Professor Posner argues that this response is economically
justified:
The market is a more efficient method of determining the optimum use
of land than legal proceedings. If my neighbor thinks his use of my
garage would be more productive than mine, he should have no
trouble persuading me to rent it to him. But ifhe merely claims that he
can use my garage more productively, he thrusts on the courts a difficult evidentiary question: which of us would really be willing to pay
more for the use of the garage?25

In a sense, the assertion that the market is more "efficient" than
legal proceedings can be interpreted as a comparative institutional
analysis: the market is the less imperfect (less costly, less often mis25.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SlljJTO

note I, at 40 (emphasis original).
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taken) institution to make the valuation decision. Interpreted this
way, the analysis of trespass is interesting and useful. But this general comparative institutional interpretation is inconsistent with Professor Posner's subsequent generalization about property rights and
remedies:
The discussion of remedies in this and the preceding section may be
generalized as follows. In conflicting-use situations in which transaction costs are high, the allocation of resources to their most valuable
uses is facilitated by denying property right holders an injunctive remedy against invasions of their rights and instead limiting them to a
remedy in damages . . . . Where transaction costs are low, injunctive
relief should normally be allowed as a matter of course . . . .26

This analysis - which represents a general theme in the economic approach - is institutionally one-sided. It focuses on variations in only one of the alternative modes of allocation of resources
- only variations in transaction costs (imperfections) in the market
are considered. When the market works well (/. e. , transaction costs
are low), it is given the responsibility for establishing the value of
resources and inducing correct behavior. The court can issue an injunction without concern for the value of the competing uses. When
the market works poorly (j.e. , transaction costs are high), the court
takes on the market's function: it prices the behavior· in question,
and sets a damage award. But the market is not the only institution
whose imperfections vary in different factual settings. The economic
analysis of legal remedies does not directly recognize the potential
importance of judicial imperfections, or the possibility that the factors that affect the market's allocative abilities may also affect the
judiciary's allocative abilities. If we postulate, as does the economic
approach, a judiciary concerned with facilitating the most efficient
allocation of resources, then the capabilities of both institutions
would seem relevant.
Is there relevant variation in the capabilities of the judiciary in
different property rights settings? To answer this question we should
ask whether the factors that alter the market's abilities also alter the
judiciary's abilities. Perhaps the most important source of variation
in transaction costs between the "garage" example that typifies the
injunctive remedy setting and the air and noise pollution examples
that characterize the damage remedy setting is the number of persons potentially affected by the property use. The trespass case envisions one owner and one trespasser. The pollution cases involve at
least one polluter and many victims. A second source of variation is
26. Id at 51 (footnotes omitted).
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the difference between the types of activity that typify the trespass
and pollution (nuisance) settings: it is arguably easier to prove and
evaluate damages in physical trespass cases. The direction of these
variations is consistent with the proposition that the market will
work more effectively as an allocative device in the trespass than in
the pollution or nuisance setting. So far, so good.
However, there is similar variation in the abilities of the judiciary. First, on the simplest level, a larger number of victims per violation can mean a larger number of suits and more administrative
costs for the judiciary. Second, it is quite possible that the costs of
each case will be greater because the existence and extent of damage
may be more difficult to evaluate in the pollution than in the trespass
setting. Third, the difficulty in assessing the damage can increase the
likelihood that opposing litigants will perceive the outcome of litigation differently. Such divergence in perception increases the chances
of litigation rather than settlement.27 Finally, and perhaps most important, air or noise pollution cases are often characterized by small
per capita damage to a large number of people. While the injury
may in the aggregate be substantial, it is likely that such low per
capita losses will be unrepresented or underrepresented in litigation.
To the extent that these losses are not fully represented, the potential
polluter will not take into account the full social impact of his or her
activity. 28
When one realizes that the effectiveness of both available institutions varies, it is no longer obvious why variation in only one institution (the market) should be the dominant explanatory factor even for
a decision maker who seeks allocative efficiency. This does not necessarily suggest that economic efficiency should be abandoned as
27. See, e.g., id at 434-38.
28. Professor Posner is aware of this problem in the nuisance setting. He refers to it as "the
lack of a procedural device for aggregating small claims." ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note I,
at 47. He suggests that "developments in the class action . . . may help to overcome this
procedural shortcoming." Id at 46-47. As his subsequent discussion of class actions indicates,
that reform - potentially valuable as it may be - leaves significant remaining imperfections
in the aggregation of small claims. Id at 449-5 I. The discussion of the Boomer case reveals
the quite plausible perception by one judge that substantial problems remain. See notes 29-30
infra and accompanying text.
Most important, although Professor Posner recognizes the existence of this substantial imperfection in the judicial process in a property remedy setting, he does not integrate the potential for this or other judicial imperfections into his general articulation of the economic
approach to property remedies. See text at note 25 supra. This treatment again reveals the use
of market attributes as the dominant determinants of the law. A judge interested in economic
efficiency would not be interested solely in the attributes of the market. This attraction to
market attributes may be inherent in the use of economic analysis that is not cast explicitly in
institutional terms. See text at note 41 infra.
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part of a legal analysis. Rather, it indicates that an inquiry that considers only variations in market characteristics is too limited.
The opinions in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 29 suggest the
value of an analytic framework that forces its user to recognize consistently the critical role of variation in the characteristics of both the
judiciary and the market. In that case, a group of landowners were
successful in a nuisance action against a polluting cement plant.
However, contrary to past precedents, the court denied them an injunction, and granted permanent damages. There was substantial
evidence that the loss to the plaintiffs, although significant in absolute terms, would be dwarfed by the cost of closing the plant that the
majority thought an injunction would force.
The decision to refuse the injunction is consistent with the economic approach. But the dissent would have issued an injunction,
and its approach is also consistent with a concern for efficient resource allocation. The dissent was concerned about the many people
in the Hudson Valley injured by the particle pollution produced by
cement plants like the defendant's. These people were unlikely to
register their loss through the damage remedy. A judge concerned
with economic efficiency could plausibly conclude that the damage
remedy would not send the correct signal to potential polluters because many injured parties would not bring action. Such a judge
could also find that the total social losses due to the pollution exceed
the social losses from pollution abatement, even abatement in the
form of plant closing. It is not obvious that the majority's decision is
correct and the dissent incorrect in efficiency terms. 30
The comparative institutional approach allows the legal analyst
to understand the institutional assumptions that would yield either
conclusion. It indicates what factors are important to a determina29. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
30. The opinions in Boomer raise broader issues of institutional comparison. The economic approach tends to emphasize only two institutions, the market and the judiciary, and
even then it systematically considers variation in only one. But the judiciary has available to it
more than the choice between itself and the market. Dominant among the alternatives is the
legislature. Part of the debate in the Boomer case involved the role of the legislature in protecting the public from pollution. The majority argued that where difficult and extensive
trade-offs are involved, the legislature is the superior institution to determine the relative values of the alternative land uses. This argument was presumably intended to answer the dissent's concern for the impact of the majority's remedy on the general public. Obviously, the
dissent disagreed.
Where the judiciary senses that both its abilities and those of the market are inadequate, it
is understandable that it would consider other institutional alternatives. One of the most interesting discussions of the relative capacities of the judiciary and the legislature in defining property rights appears in Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). This case and its opinions are helpful to a basic analysis
of property rights.
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tion of the strengths and weaknesses in a legal position. Lawyers
who have an appreciation for the various institutional imperfections
can attempt the difficult but necessary predictions either by introspection - asking how they would balance these factors in the given
case - or by the use of any direct information that they have about
the way that the specific decision maker might evaluate the relevant
factors. The approach can also provide the lawyer with some idea of
which facts to emphasize and which to refute to produce a favorable
decision.
2. Th; Role of Custom in the .Determination of Negligence
The determination of negligence is assigned to the trier of fact the jury. Although the judge's instructions offer some guidance, in
general the task of defining unreasonable conduct is left to the jury's
discretion. 31 However, the jury's discretion is often channeled by the
interjection of safety determinations made by other institutions. One
example of this process - the role of penal statutes - will be considered in the next section. Here the issue is the role of the custom of
the comrimnity.
Custom substitutes for the jury's independent assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of a safety step - the determination
of due care. The jury is given information about the traditional behavior of a sector of the populace with the defendant's characteristics. The judge can control the impact of this custom evidence by
excluding the evidence as irrelevant, varying the jury instructions, or
by directing verdicts on the basis of unchallenged custom evidence.
This range of judicial reactions is reflected in the leading treatise on
the subject:
In a particular case, where there is nothing in the evidence or in
common experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this inference
may be so strong that it calls for a directed verdict on the issue of
negligence. . . . Some few courts formerly made the effort to treat all
customs in this manner, and to enlarge the normal inference into an
"unbending test" of negligence, under which the ordinary usages of a
business or industry became the sole criterion as to what the actor
should, as a reasonable man, have done.
Such an arbitrary rule proved in the long run impossible to justify. . . . [C]ustoms and usages themselves are many and various;
some are the result of careful thought and decision, while others arise
from the kind of inadvertence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring
31. This determination of reasonableness arguably involves the implicit balancing of the
advantages and disadvantages of the safety step which the defendant allegedly failed to take a balance captured by Judge Learned Hand's famous articulation in United States v. Carroll
Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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and comer-cutting that normally is associated with negligence. 32

The economic approach offers an analysis of custom that goes
beyond this conventional approach. The economic approach argues
that the custom defense will be available where there is a market
incentive, independent of the threat of liability, to take safety precautions. Situations where the potential victims are customers of the
potential injurers provide one example. In such cases, there is reason
to believe that the industry's customs meet the standard of reasonable care.
But this treatment is incomplete, because the market cannot be
described in dichotomous terms (j.e., it provides complete incentives
or it does not). A fuller presentation of the institutional factors affecting the market's ability tq yield the correct custom would reflect a
spectrum of potential market imperfections. Because the market will
never be perfect, the custom observed will always be imperfect.
Thus, an analysis of custom that considers only the market does not
really explain when custom would be relevant.
The comparative institutional approach, however, points to the
missing considerations: the characteristics of the trier of fact. The
judge and jury are also imperfect, and the variation in this imperfection and its integration into the analysis of legal rules are important. 33 One important factor is the jury's lack of technical
expertise.34 The jury is less attractive as a decision maker, the more
technically complex the safety step involved in the case.
The contrast between the economic and comparative institutional
approaches is revealed by an examination of the limited role of custom allowed by Judge Hand in the famous T.J. Hooper 35 case and
the extensive role of custom in medical malpractice cases. T.J.
Hooper involved the loss of barges in a storm. The barge owner
(plaintiff) argued that the tug owner (defendant) was negligent in
failing to have a radio that would have warned of the impending
storm. The evidence indicated to the court that such radios were not
customarily employed in the industry. Yet despite the fact that there
32. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 166-67 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). The passage reflects the state of the conventional analysis, which tends to restate the issue, along with
long lists of.factors which are not linked to any clear conception of why and when these factors
are important.
33. Professor Posner later raises the issue of custom in the context of his discussion of the
general attributes of courts and legislatures. See EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note l, at 402.
Again, while recognizing the existence of judicial imperfection on a general level, he did not
integrate this perception into his analysis of the specific issues.
34. See note 63 injra.
35. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
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was a buyer-seller relationship, and that all the parties seemed sophisticated, Judge Learned Hand held that the custom evidence was
unnecessary, and affirmed the decision for the plaintiff.
Professor Posner finds this treatment of custom inexplicable.36
However, he argues that the treatment of custom in the medical
malpractice context is quite consistent with his analysis. Rarely can
a plaintiff prevail in a malpractice case without strong testimony that
the defendant has violated the custom of the industry. Standard jury
instructions are cast in terms of custom. Professor Posner argues that
this is explained by the "buyer-seller relationship" between patient
and physician. But the market for health services hardly ranks
among the best functioning markets. Patients generally are unsophisticated and unknowledgeable consumers of this complex service.37 The market in the medical malpractice setting is substantially
less perfect than in the T.J. Hooper setting.
The different role for custom in the two situations is sensible
when one considers that medical malpractice presents a much more
difficult and complex issue than did the simple safety question in T.J.
Hooper. In that case, the question was merely whether ships should
be equipped with radios to hear weather reports. Judge Hand considered the issue relatively straightforward and capable of decision
by the normal trier of fact. On the other hand, medical malpractice
questions are highly technical and substantially beyond the ability of
the normal trier of fact. In this example, the role of custom depends
on the perceived capacity of the nonmarket institution, the factfinder. The economic approach considers only the variation in the
market. Comparative institutional analysis takes into account variations in the capabilities of both the market and the fact finder, and
can thereby point us to the most important determinants of decisions.38
These two areas of the common law involve situations where the
market is plausibly an important institutional alternative. Both
36. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 126.

31. See Schwartz & Komesar, .Doctors, .Damages and .Deterrence-An Economic View of
Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1282 (1978).
38. Interestingly, the lists of factors employed by traditional torts scholars to explain custom include consideration of the technical expertise of the jury. Thus, after trying a number of
factors, in connection with the role of custom in medical malpractice, Professor Prosser makes
the following observation: "It seems clear, in any case, that the result is closely tied in with the
layman's ignorance of medical matters and the necessity of expert testimony." W. PROSSER,
supra note 32, at 165.
However, these analyses not only slight consideration of variation in the attributes of the
market, but they also generally fail to construct a succinct framework that integrates the factors that they suggest and the facts of the case.
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areas present questions of institutional substitution. Yet the traditional approaches involve no basic institutional analysis, and the economic approach considers only one, and always the same,
institution - the market. The comparative institutional approach
seems a more sensible and complete mode of analysis.39
The failure of the economic approach to consider systematically
variation in the attributes or imperfections of nonmarket institutions
does not appear based on a general unawareness of these imperfections.40 The problem lies in the failure to include systematically
39. There is, arguably, a subtle methodological point involved here. Professor Posner's
analysis could be restated as a variant of the comparative institutional approach. The economic approach could be cast as one that assumes that the legal decision maker is interested in
the least imperfect institutional alternative and that, at least in the context of the common law,
the only important institutional variation occurs in the market. The assumption is that, for
analytical purposes, the judiciary is viewed as imperfect at a constant level.
The use of the comparative institutional approach requires making choices: not every institution will seem a plausible alternative; not every attribute will seem a plausible source of
variation. If I were to design a narrow version of the comparative institutional approach to
deal with custom and perhaps property rights and remedies, it would seem reasonable to consider only two institutions - the market and the judiciary. But it seems far less sensible to
narrow the focus by a general assumption that of these two institutions only the market reveals
significant variation in its abilities. That is the most dubious element of the economic approach to property rights and custom in particular and to the common law in general.
At first blush, contract law seems an area where this extreme version of the comparative
institutional focus might survive. However, the evolution of work in this area reveals the value
of a broader comparative institutional approach. Professor Posner's treatment of contract remedies reveals the same problems noted in connection with property remedies. See ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 88-93, 95-97. In particular, his claim that the expect:.~ion damages
remedy is superior to specific performance cannot be argued without some recourse to the
characteristics of the judicial decision maker. The subsequent discussions by Kronman and
Schwartz reveal this. Kronman, Specific Pe,formance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978);
Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Pe,formance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). Even these treatments
would have benefited from a more balanced consideration of the variation in judicial capabilities.
Professor Posner's treatment of contract law has been most effective when he has been
forced to consider the attributes of the judiciary. Such a step was necessary to understand the
law on gratuitous promises, where some but not all voluntary transactions are enforced. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977). But this insight
was not consistently applied in the economic approach to contract law. Consider Professor
Posner's treatment of incapacity, where he again relies only on variation in the market. See
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note I, at 80. Incapacity is not necessarily dichotomous - one is
not either capable or incapable. The courts are not perfectly able to determine the correct
substance of the contract. A comparative institutional approach would look for variation in
the conditions for contract validity under incapacity or the substitution of alternative decision
makers such as parents, guardians, and trustees.
In general, contract law should be more amenable to consistent treatment by an explicit
comparative institutional approach than by an implicit single institutional approach.
40. See note 28 supra for a discussion of Professor Posner's recognition of the problem of
"aggregating claims."
Professor Posner recognizes and discusses the comparison between the judiciary and the
market in general terms in a chapter separate from the analysis of the common law. Although
this treatment does not correct his failure to compare institutions in interpreting common-law
rules, its existence paradoxically emphasizes the need to do so.
Professor Posner's discussion itself reflects the disadvantages of an approach not cast explicitly in terms of imperfect institutions. The thrust of his brief discussion is captured in the
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these considerations in the actual analyses of legal rules and decisions.4I
B.

The Judiciary Versus Other Institutions

This section will consider some examples of legal issues in which
the market is not clearly an important alternative institution. In general, as might be expected, the economic approach has afforded these
issues less attention. The first part of the section considers another
following passage: "The fundamental difference between law and the market as methods of
allocating resources is that the market is a much more efficient mechanism of valuing competing uses. In the market people have to back up their value assertions with money (or some
equivalent sacrifice of alternative opportunities)." ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 402.
If the market were "a much more efficient method of valuing competing uses," why would
we ever have the intervention of the courts and their damage remedy? Professor Posner means
that the market has an advantage in evaluation because, when the marketfunctions well, actual
expenditures reveal preferences better than the adversary process where people do not "back
up their values." But that suggests that the "fundamental difference" does not exist in the form
articulated. Sometimes the judiciary is "a much more efficient mechanism of valuing com pet•
ing uses." The judgment as to when this is so depends on a comparison of imperfections in
the particular factual setting, not on the articulation of the imperfections in only one institution.
41. This failure may well be the inadvertent product of the application of economics
outside its conventional setting without careful consideration of the full implications of the
change in settings.
In a recent article, suggesting that there are inherent limits on the march of economics into
areas of human choice previously the bastions of other social sciences, Ronald Coase offers the
following definition of economics: "What economists study is the working of the social institutions which bind together the economic system: firms, markets for goods and services, labour
markets, capital markets, the banking system, international trade, and so on. It is the common
interest in these social institutions which distinguishes the economics profession." Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 206-07 (1978). This definition em•
phasizes the social institutions traditionally associated with the economic system. This
definition is important not because it is the only or even best definition of economic analysis,
but rather because it reflects the traditional setting in which the tools of economics have
evolved. It is all too easy to carry over the traditional focus on the attributes of the market and
then to concentrate only on variations in these attributes. When variation in nonmarket institutions is likely, it is clearly better to use an analytical framework that avoids this tendency.
It is important to recognize the central role that economists have played in the considera•
tion of variation in nonmarket institutions. Ronald Coase and Gary Becker, among others,
have contributed mightily in this vein. Coase's article on the firm provides an imaginative
perception of the institutional underpinnings of economic analysis. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937). Coase's classic article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
EcoN. 1 (1960), again stressed the underlying institutional nature of economic analysis and the
errors of economists who failed to focus on these institutional factors.
Gary Becker has espoused the application of the tools of economic analysis to nontradi•
tional areas. He has produced many interesting insights into nonmarket behavior. E.g., G.
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
In general, economists have contributed substantially to the understanding of nonmarket
phenomena, and they can be depended upon to aid the effort to fill out our understanding of
institutional attributes. However, the failure of economic analysis explicitly to consider institutional attributes can contribute to applications that miss the sort of institutional variation to
which economists like Coase are sensitive. This is especially true in nontraditional settings,
The quality of economic analysis in general might profit from a clearer emphasis on institutional attributes. Coase made an analogous suggestion twenty years ago. See 3 J. L. & EcoN,
at 42-43.
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substitution for the jury in the torts context - the use of penal statutes to determine negligence. The second part briefly overviews institutional decisions within the judiciary - the traditional categories
of procedure and evidence. The third part turns to an area of law
that the economic approach has generally omitted or abandoned constitutional law.
1. The Role of Penal Statutes in the .Determination
of Tort Liability
If a party charged with negligence in a tort action has violated a
relevant penal statute, the violation may evince negligence. Like
custom, the role of penal statutes in determining tort liability is an
important example of substitution for the determination of the jury.
Common-law judges are faced with the choice of whether to substitute the legislature's determination of due care for that of the jury.42
But unlike custom, there is no treatment of the role of penal statutes
by the economic approach. The omission is consistent with the narrow institutional focus on the market. When the judge determines
whether violation of a penal statute is to affect or preclude the jury's
determination of due care, he or she is choosing between the jury
and the legislature. The market is not an important alternative.
Whatever the reason for the omission by the economic approach, the
role of penal statutes can be cast comfortably in comparative institutional terms.
A number of criteria affect the role of penal statutes in negligence
cases. Quite sensibly, the courts have required that the legislation be
relevant to the fact situation in the case. The legislation must have a
safety purpose and that purpose must be relevant to the type of mis42. The statement of the issue here may be considered too insensitive to the position of the
legal positivist. The legislature has the power to define the duty of care and designate its mode
of determination. Therefore, it may be disturbing to some for me to say that the choice belongs to the judge. However, there are several considerations that should obviate this reaction.
First, the use of penal statutes is an area where the legislature has not clearly indicated a
desire to change the mode of determining civil liability. The analysis that follows can be recast
in terms of the search for legislative intent. In the context of penal statutes, the court does not
receive much aid from the legislature and, therefore, even a positivist would admit the need for
significant recourse to the judge's own intuitions in order to reconstruct the legislature's intent.
The discussion that follows could be stated in those terms without changing its basic meaning.
Second, this analysis is not normative: it need not argue that judges ought to exceed a
position assigned them; it need only argue that there is a tendency to do so. Vaguely worded
statutes, constitutions, or contracts require judges to go beyond simple reliance on the express
language. A positivist judge may feel more constrained than a realist judge, but he or she still
needs guidelines beyond the language, whether these guidelines are called discretion, principle, policy, or power.
This issue is raised more dramatically by my analysis of constitutional law. Most of the
above points are relevant even there.
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hap and actors involved in the case.43 But even if the legislature has
spoken to the general safety problem involved in the case, its safety
determination does not always prevail in the civil setting. In some
instances, violation of the penal statute is determinative. In others, it
is only evidentiary. In still others, it is ignored.
A comparative institutional approach would look for explanations of these variations by examining the perceived relative abilities
of two institutions: the jury and the legislature. This approach
would parallel the earlier analysis of custom which stressed variation
in the jury and the market. In this connection, the traditional legal
scholarship on the role of penal statutes is instructive.
One of the earliest and most famous works on the use of penal
statutes is Thayer's, Public Wrong and Private Action .44 Thayer felt
that violation of a criminal statute was inconsistent with the definition of a reasonably prudent man. 45 He argued for a negligence per
se approach, rather than one that allowed the jury to view a violation
as merely indicative of negligence. This approach was criticized by
Lowndes, who thought that it undermined the role of the proper determiner of the "social standard of conduct in negligence" - the
. jury.46 It was clear to Lowndes that the jury should be the sole and
final determiner of the standard of care. Violation of penal statutes
was at most evidence of negligence to be weighed by the jury after its
fashion. 47
This exchange represents two "single institution" approaches to
the problem. Thayer believed that a safety determination by the legislature was superior; Lowndes thought that the jury's determination
should prevail. From a comparative institutional viewpoint, positions that declare the absolute superiority of one institution over a
large range of issues are questionable.
43. This threshold is illustrated by Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874). The plaintiffs
sheep were washed overboard from the defendant's boat. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide separate pens for the sheep, and attempted to establish the defendant's liability by pointing to a violation of a penal statute that required separate
pens. The court refused to allow liability to be based on such a violation because the statute
was enacted for sanitation purposes. The legislature had not concerned itself with the safety
issue involved in the case.
44. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914).
45. Id at 323.
46. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN, L. REV. 361, 367
(1932).
47. [T]he qualities of this superb individual [the reasonably prudent man] are not determined by legal rules, but by the social judgment of the jurors. . . . The formulation of
the social standard of conduct for unintentional injuries is for the jury, not for the court,
and, consequently, it would appear to follow that the jury must determine whether the
violation of a criminal statute is or is not negligence.
Id at 369.
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Three extensive articles by Clarence Morris present a more balanced position.48 Morris argued for and noted a wider variety of
responses to penal statutes.49 The problein with Morris's' approach is
that, although it stresses flexibility, it only hints at when courts
should or do vary their use of the legislation. He suggests that
courts apply legislation vigorously only when it is "an acceptably
more exact standard by which to measure the breach of duty," but
not when the legislature has enacted "a requirement of extra precaution which even those who use great care would ordinarily suppose
unnecessary," or when the enactment is "a dangerous technical mistake."50
This vague mandate might be sensible if there were an institution
that would easily discern whether the legislation comports with due
care. The institution that Morris had in mind is the appellate court.
However, even appellate courts do not generally view themselves as
the best determiners of the standard of ordinary care. 51 When appellate courts are forced to decide whether the legislature or the jury
will determine due care, their decisions are more likely determined
by their view of the relative abilities of the alternative institutions,
rather than by a desire to substitute their own safety decision.
Three decisions of the New York Court of Appeals that have become casebook traditions further illustrate the subtle variations in
the law and the operation of the comparative institutional approach.
In Martin v. Herzog, 52 the defendant drove an automobile in the
wrong lane around a curve in the highway and collided with the
plaintiffs horse-drawn wagon. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs deceased husband had been contributorily negligent per se because he was travelling without lights in violation of a penal statute.
The trial court submitted the negligence issues to the jury with an
instruction that allowed the jury to decide whether the violation of
the legislative standard of due care was excusable under the circumstances. The jury decided that the violation was consistent with due
care, and allowed the plaintiff to recover. Judge Cardozo, writing
48. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REv. 453
(1933); The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1949); and
The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEXAS L. REv. 143
(1949).
49. "If the decisions of courts in torts cases are to be best calculated to serve the needs of
society, the judge should rule that the defendant's criminal conduct constitutes negligence in
some cases, while in others a different course should be followed." 46 HARV. L. REv. at 453.
50. 49 COLUM. L. REV. at 42.
51. This issue will be raised on a more general level in the subsequent discussion of constitutional law.
52. 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
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for the majority of the Court of Appeals, reversed. He held that the
violation of the safety statute was negligence per se. The jury was
not to be allowed to dispense with the legislature's standard of due
care.
The subsequent case of Ted/av. El!man 53 appeared to raise the
same issue. There a brother and sister walking along the side of a
busy highway were struck from the rear by a passing car. The
pedestrians were walking on the right side of the highway with their
backs to traffic. A statute required that pedestrians "keep to the left
of the center line" of the highway. This provision was enacted to
allow pedestrians to "step aside for passing vehicles with least danger to themselves and least obstruction to vehicular traffic." The defendant requested a dismissal of the complaint based on the
violation of the statute - a request that seemed consistent with Martin. However, despite what appeared to be a clear violation of a
relevant statute, the trial judge allowed the jury to decide the relevance of the violation to the plaintiffs' contributory negligence.
The Court of Appeals found no error in allowing the jury to decide that the violation was consistent with due care, and it affirmed
the verdict for the plaintiff. Two judges dissented and simply cited
Martin. The majority, in an opinion by Judge Lehman, distinguished the statute in Ted/a because it was intended to embody common-law pedestrian practices, which permitted exceptions where it
was safer to walk on the other side of the highway. The majority
pointed to no language in the statute or the legislative debate to support this alleged intent.
It is difficult, at first glance, to distinguish the two cases. The
plaintiffs' choice to violate the statute in Ted/a was arguably justified
because it represented due care, but the jury in Martin had also decided that the violation was justified. Yet Judge Cardozo, a past
master in discovering implicit legislative intent,54 refused to read a
flexible intent into the statute in Martin. Both cases involve instances in which the legislature had offered a seemingly relevant determination of due care. In both cases, there are indications that the
violations were justified. In both cases, the statutes embodied sensible general rules. Yet the Ted/a court permitted the jury to make an
exception to the statutory standard, while the Martin court did not.
The cases are, however, consistent with a sensible and simple institutional comparison. The jury is commonly suspect because it has
53. 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987, 300 N.Y.S. 1051 (1939).
54. A classic example of this Cardozo touch can be found in the second part of his famous
opinion in Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kemochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
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little expertise or experience with public policy questions. The legislature is commonly seen as more capable in both of these senses. It
can look at the broad context of the rule, it has access to experts
outside of the strained adversarial setting, and it has greater experience in assessing the information that it receives. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Judge Cardozo gave so much weight to the legislative
determination in comparison to that of the suspect jury in Martin.
But the comparative advantage does not all fall in one direction.
The legislature and the jury have different perspectives. The jury is
privy to the particulars of the individual case; the legislature must
generalize. If the general rule set by the legislature is potentially
subject to many exceptions, it is attractive to :find a role for a caseby-case decision maker. The legislature may generally be correct,
but if an institution is available that can pick out the exceptions and
still apply the general rule, it may be prudent to choose it.
Unlike Morris's approach, this analysis does not presuppose that
judges - appellate or trial - view themselves as better determiners
of safety. The issue is not whether the particular case is an exception
or the particular legislation "a technical mistake." The court may
assume that the standard set by the statute is in general the correct
one. But if there are a wide range of potential exceptions, the court
may sensibly see the case-by-case decision maker as the superior (albeit still imperfect) decision maker. The court in Ted/a emphasized
its perception that there could be many instances in which it might
be safer to walk with rather than against the traffic. The court
ascribed this perception to the legislature and read the exception into
the statute.
Brown v. Shyness reflects the comparative institutional analysis
just employed, and suggests another potential source of legislative
imperfection. Ted/a and Martin can be explained by reference to
whether the legislative rule is one that admits of exceptions; in
Brown, the explanation lies in the imperfections of the legislative
process itself.
In Brown, the plaintiff alleged that she had been injured because
of negligent treatment by a chiropractor. The chiropractor had
clearly violated a statute prohibiting unlicensed physicians from
treating patients. Unlike Ted/a, the defendant could not argue that
he was providing safer medical care by violating the statute. And
the legislation here apparently was intended to reduce mishaps due
to treatment by unqualified practitioners. The trial court instructed
55. 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926).

1380

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 79:1350

the jury that they might consider the violation as "some evidence,
more or less cogent, of negligence which you may consider for what
it is worth, along with all the other evidence in the case."56 The
instruction resembles the one that Judge Cardozo rejected in Martin
because it gave too little weight to the statutory violation. However,
the jury decided that negligence was established by all of the evidence, presumably including the statutory violation.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. It held
that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that the violation
had any relevance. The majority opinion, again by Judge Lehman,
noted that there was direct evidence of the defendant's actual behavior, training and skill, and that "the absence of a license does not
seem to strengthen [the] inference that might be drawn from such
evidence . . . ." 57
Such a statement avoids the issue. In most cases involving a statutory violation, there is other evidence on the issue of ordinary care.
However, presumably because many safety questions are complex,
the fear of jury error provides a reason to give weight to a legislative
determination of due care - often allowing it to replace the jury's
assessment. Whether someone possesses the necessary skill to provide medical care is a technically complex issue,58 the legislature has
suggested that the licensing decision could evince the defendant's
training and ability.
The decision not to treat the violation as negligence per se is understandable. Even if, in general, unlicensed practitioners provide
insufficient care, there is a strong enough possibility of exceptions to
justify :finding a role for a case-by-case decision maker.
It is less obvious why the Brown court allowed the violation of
the statute no role at all, given the complexity of medical practice
and the expertise of the licensing board. The answer may be that the
key variable is not expertise, but rather institutional bias. The issue
is analogous to the treatment of industry expertise when analyzing
the role of custom. The industry presumably always has technical
expertise, but it does not always have the correct incentives to use it.
Special interest groups, such as the medical profession, may be overrepresented in legislative or administrative decisions concerning
56. 242 N.Y. at 179, 151 N.E. at 198.
57. 242 N.Y. at 182, 151 N.E. at 199.
58. Consider the discussion of the unusually strong role of custom in the medical malpractice context. See text at notes 36-38 supra. This complexity provides an institutionally based
distinction from the easier case where an automobile accident involves an unlicensed driver.
There one would more easily accept complete reliance on a jury, since the average person
generally has substantial experience with the techniques of safe driving.
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medical licensing statutes. This distortion of legislative incentives
may not have been lost on the Brown majority. 59
2. .Decisions Within the Judicial Institution Jury Substitution in General

The use of penal statutes and custom in tort liability are examples of a more general comparative institutional issue - the role of
the jury versus a range of other imperfect institutions. This theme
cuts across many areas of procedure and evidence on common law,
statutory, and constitutional levels.
The economic approach has offered some useful analytic contributions to the understanding of procedure. In particular, the simple
model of settlement has provided significant insights and has aided
analyses of discovery and other procedural issues. 60 But the economic approach has again focused its attention on the attributes of
private decision makers - litigants, potential injurers, and potential
victims - as the basic determinants of procedure. It has largely ignored the attributes of the nonmarket decision makers - the jury,
the judge, the legislature, and administrative agencies. The result is
an interesting, but systematically skewed, representation of procedure.
The economic approach, like most of the conventional approaches, emphasizes trade-off between the benefits and costs of increased accuracy. It is sensible to emphasize that the reduction in
error is not costless. The economic approach also discusses the implications of error rates on the amount of litigation, the rate of settlement, and the response of the actors whose behavior society wishes
to affect by its substantive laws.
But the economic approach generally has emphasized the effects
of changes in error, not the sources of changes in error - the decision-making institutions. While it is quite plausible to envision the
59. q: Hawkeye Lumber Co. v. Day, 203 Iowa 172, 210 N.W. 430 (1926), where, explicitly
reacting to its perception that a board materialman's lien statute had been framed with no
effective representative for property owners involved in the legislative bargaining, the court
imposed special constructive trust requirements on the materialman to prevent harsh application of the statute against a property owner. The issue oflegislative bias is raised in the discussions of constitutional law, see text at notes 68-84 i'!fra, and the treatment of legislative
efficiency by the economic approach. See text at notes 10-14 supra.
The recurrence of this issue indicates that insights evolved from a comparative institutional
analysis in one area can assist the analysis of seemingly different issue areas. As such, it
reveals a potential advantage of applying this approach to law in general.
60. See generally Gould, The Economics of Legal Co,iflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 284-95
(1973); Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & EcoN. 61 (1971); Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1973).
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common-law decision maker as concerned with the potential effects
of reduced error in the formulation of rules, it seems implausible
that this concern would not be joined with - and likely dominated
by - a concern for the sources of reduced error. In this connection,
it would be odd if the attributes of only one set of actors - litigants
- was relevant. There are many potential sources of error within
the judicial setting: jury, judge, expert witnesses, legislative input,
and so on. In particular, the perceived characteristics of the jury ostensibly the basic fact finder in litigation - would seem relevant
in determining the rules of procedure and evidence. The economic
approach has seldom considered the role of the jury.61
The issue of whether to use a jury or a more expert, but more
general decision maker - which surfaced in the discussion of penal
statutes - can be extended to instances where an appellate or even a
trial court is asked to substitute a general rule for case-by-case jury
determination. The evolution of absolute liability and the related
issue of res ipsa !oquitur in tort law, and the imposition of simple
standards by directed verdict that prompted the famed Holmes-Cardozo confrontation (the "stop, look and listen" cases), reflect such a
choice.62 In none of these issue areas do we see either complete
abandonment of or complete deference to the jury, and analyzing
these cases in terms of the comparative skills of judges and juries
might provide useful insights.63
61. Professor Posner gives the jury barely two pages in his book. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,

supra note 1, at § 21.11.
Although not every institution deserves sophisticated treatment, it is difficult for a legal
analyst to argue that the jury does not have a presumptive claim to intellectual attention as
great as that of the market, especially when procedural rules are at issue.
62. Holmes articulated his famous "stop, look, and listen" maxim in Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). This attempt to prompt trial judges to formulate and apply
rules generalized from their observations ofjury decisions reflects Holmes's concern for consistency in the law. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 110-11, 120-24 (1881). This same
theme and its implications for the litigant and for the potential violator's behavior has been
expanded productively in Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
However, this attempt was short lived as the Court, per Justice Cardozo, denounced this
particular attempt at consistency in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). As we have
seen in the penal statute context, Cardozo was not an unyielding devotee of the jury. Nor can
one imagine that Justice Holmes was an unyielding supporter of the trial judge as the sole
determiner of fact. The exchange - about directed verdicts - reflects a difference in view
about the same two-part issue - (1) whether the inaccuracy of the jury as a case-by-case
determiner was greater or less than the inaccuracy of a general rule, and (2) even if the jury
was more accurate, whether greater complexity in the pattern of fluctuating jury outcomes
costs society more than would a less accurate, but clearer, general rule.
63. The role of the jury is an important and controversial issue within the federal judiciary.
The expansion of the seventh amendment right to a jury in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959), the subsequent attempts to narrow this right in Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commn., 430 U.S. 442 (1977), and Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), and the growing number oflower court cases that have split
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Whether a comparative institutional approach will aid the analysis of procedural rules must await specific applications. However,
relative to the economic approach, a comparative institutional approach seems better able to address the full range of procedural issues. The economic approach to procedure and evidence is defective
because here, as elsewhere, its limited institutional focus constrains
its coverage.
3. .Beyond the Common Law -

Constitutional Law

Although an extensive comparative institutional analysis of constitutional law must await a work whose major theme is constitutional law and judicial review, 64 it is consistent with the theme of this
Article to consider a brief application to show that the same analytic
approach can be used for both common-law and constitutional-law
over the issue of the right to a jury in highly complex cases, see, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Calif. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation,
420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), revd, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1976); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 375 F.
Supp. 1403 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1974), revd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 929 (1980), have produced an important controversy over the role of the jury-a controversy that will likely force a decision from the Supreme Court.
Such a decision involves evaluating the relative merits of the jury and alternative decision
makers. On a normative basis, the Court could be aided by insight into the relative merits of
various alternative decision makers, such as their ability to handle information and their institutional biases. The seventh amendment area has long been a bastion of "historical analysis,"
but the vast mass of history requires a framework or grid by which to be read. The framework
may often be unarticulated, but some framework is usually there. Perhaps a comparative institutional analysis would be useful here. There have already been indications that the Court is
searching for a mode to resolve the problem which allows some leeway in the historical interpretation. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
64. Although a thorough consideration of the literature on constitutional judicial review is
beyond the scope of this Article, an institutional focus can be found in this rich body of scholarly endeavor. Discussions of the institutional competency of the judiciary are found, for example, in Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. I (1957), and Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
Recently, the works of John Hart Ely have presented a broad treatment of judicial review
which relies heavily on the attributes of the legislative or democratic process. These works
have culminated in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Even from the title, one can
see that Professor Ely's analysis focuses on the malfunctioning of the majoritarian institutions.
He argues effectively for the need for a process or institutional approach. In a very effective
treatment, he compares this approach to the existing basic approaches to judicial review. In
another recent publication, Jesse Choper has also attempted to integrate attributes of the legislative process into constitutional analysis. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
The approaches of both Ely and Choper have drawn criticism. The most sweeping comes
from Professor Laurence Tribe who discounts the role of a process-focused analysis. See
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of' Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980). A discussion of the differences between the comparative institutional approach and
Professor Ely's approach, as well as a consideration of Professor Tribe's concerns, belongs in a
fuller treatment of constitutional law. It will have to suffice for the present simply to note that
the institutional approach to constitutional law has attracted both mterest and criticism.
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issues. This application will accept the efficiency goal postulated by
the economic approach, and will attempt to demonstrate that even
given this assumption, an analysis sensitive to the more complete institutional picture can yield useful insights in the constitutional-law
context. To this end, this section considers an area of constitutional
law that the proponents of the economic approach consider indicative of the differences between the analytic underpinnings of the
common law and constitutional law - the rise and fall of economic
due process.65
The economic approach has lavished little attention on constitutional law, 66 perhaps because of the economic approach's preoccupation with market attributes. In constitutional-law cases, courts must
settle controversies that directly involve the public sector. They are
often asked to review actions of the legislature, or to otherwise determine the roles to be played by various public sector institutions.
Here the courts must choose between the federal and state public
sectors, or between the various branches of government. The attributes of the market and voluntary choice are not necessarily dominant, even when individual rights are at stake. Thus, a framework
such as the economic approach, whose major analytic bulwark is the
market, may despair of understanding constitutional law.
But constitutional law decisions can be organized with a compar65. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 497-509.
The issue of substantive due process, of which economic due process is a prominent example, is among the most controversial areas of constitutional law. It is an area co=only analyzed in terms of ideological concerns and natural law principles - a tendency consistent with
the Court's use of such terms as "fundamental rights." Even those attracted to an institutional
analysis have eschewed substantive due process as an unfortunate aberration. Thus, Professor
Ely, who seems to favor an institutional or process analysis, rejects both the Lochner era and
the more recent right of privacy cases as unrelated to the concern for process defects that he
argues should be the core of constitutional judicial review. See J. ELY, supra note 64, at 14-15.
66. Constitutional law apparently receives the same general treatment as legislation both are unconnected to economic efficiency and therefore, the economic approach. See text
at note 4 supra. The exclusion of constitutional law from the economic approach to legal
decision making seems a priori less plausible than the exclusion of legislation. The basic efficiency principle of the economic approach is articulated in the context of 'judge-made or
co=on law." One could understand why the theory might fail when the locus o.f decision
making switched from the judiciary to the legislature. But it is somewhat more difficult to
fathom why the failure should occur when one retains the same decision maker - the judiciary.
Recently, Professor Frank Michelman has attempted a brief economic analysis of constitutional law. Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theo,y of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 431 (1980). Although the approach differs substantially from my own, it seems
to share my view that a single approach should handle both areas. Professor Michel.man's
treatment is, at the least, ambivalent about the economic approach in general. His exercise
appears aimed as much at questioning the application of the economic approach to co=on
law as at expanding its application to constitutional law. A consideration of the substance of
his approach and its relationship to a comparative institutional analysis of constitutional law
must await an article whose basic purpose is constitutional law.
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ative institutional approach. A constitution allocates responsibility
among social institutions. In our system with its federal tradition, its
multiple branches of government at each level, and its commitment
to individual freedom and voluntary choice, the variety of institutional alternatives available to the constitutional decision maker is
substantial. Because each of these institutions possesses its own imperfections and attractions, the constitutional choice is staggering.
Yet constitutional law - whether it is drawn from the words of the
founding fathers, the notions of natural law, the text of the document, or the psyche of the judge - is necessarily a choice among
imperfect institutions.
A comparative institutional approach visualizes the constitutional-law judge, like the common-law judge, allocating responsibility among imperfect institutions. An obviously important institution
involved in the constitutional decision is the entity whose action is
reviewed. In the context of substantive due process issues, that entity
is the legislature. 67 Consistent with the comparative institutional focus, the jurist is concerned with more than just the institution being
reviewed. As with the analysis of the common law, the comparative
institutional analysis of constitutional law initially can focus its attention on the judiciary (the reviewing institution) as the alternative
to the legislature. Variations in judicial competence and availability
of judicial resources are central, as are similar variations in the legislature. Again, there are parallels to the comparative institutional
analysis of the common law.
The Lochner era discussed here spans at least thirty years and
numerous changes in the personnel of the Court. The discussion
largely abstracts from these changes in personality and perception.
The major value of a general framework is its ability to produce basic insights into complex legal issues and, thereby, to provide the
organization and basis for more extensive study. The approach does
not deny that individual jurists di.ffer; it claims only that there are
sufficient similarities to enable a simple framework to capture important insights, and to allow more systematic identification of the differences.
The beginning of economic due process is commonly associated
67. A major component in an institutional analysis would be a workable theory of public
sector or legislative imperfections. Although the range of possible models and failures is substantial, there are a limited number of simple models that may provide substantial insights into
constitutional law. For a treatment of two simple, polar models, see Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in WEISBROD, HANDLER & KOMESAR, PuBLIC INTEREST LAW
(1978).
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with the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York. 68 In Lochner, the Court
declared unconstitutional a New York statute which set minimum
hours for bakers. The Court based its holding on the notion of liberty of contract, which it read into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the Court gave the federal judiciary
greater power to determine whether and under what conditions the
legislature could interfere with the rights of individuals, especially in
commercial settings. The demise of this doctrine occurred in the
mid- to late-1930s,69 and the Court moved to the opposite extreme in
the "hands off' cases of the 1950s and 1960s.70
The question is whether one can understand the rise and fall of
economic due process as a series of choices among imperfect decision makers consistent with a societal goal approximated by the
efficient allocation of resources. We could begin with a single institutional focus like that of the economic approach and generate an
explanation for at least the rise of economic due process which parallels the economic approach to property rights discussed previously:
the Court believed that voluntary choice and the market generally
operated well, and it allocated most decisionmaking to that mechanism, allowing exceptions only where there were grounds to believe
that significant market failures existed. 71
From the outset, the decisions of the Lochner era recognized
grounds for governmental intervention in the market. These
grounds roughly paralleled the conventional varieties of market failure employed in the economic approach to the common law - "extemality, monopoly, or information problems."72 The Lochner
opinion itself recognizes the role of governmental intervention where
the parties are not suiJuris - the extreme version of an information
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The notion of"liberty of contract" was first employed to invalidate
legislation under the fourteenth amendment in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897),
where the Court struck down a Louisiana insurance law that was applied to prohibit using the
mails to make a business deal with a maritime insurance company operating in another state.
Although the era took its name from the Lochner case, its beginning is more accurately associated withA/f.geyer. Lochner is the more controversial and famous case perhaps because of its
broad pronouncements and its dissents by Harlan and Holmes.
69. The moment of major decline is generally marked by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937). There the Court validated a minimum wage law for women, in effect,
overruling a case decided the previous year.
70. The classic due process cases here are Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). The latter is especially interesting because it represents the most explicit announcement of the wide discretion lodged in the political process, and because it precedes by only two years the apparent resurrection of substantive
due process in the "privacy'' area in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. See text at notes 25-28 supra.
72. These are the market imperfections enumerated by Professor Posner in his recent articulation of the economic approach. See text at note 3 supra.
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problem.73 The Court throughout the era allowed both state and
federal legislatures to regulate businesses "affected with a public interest."74 Although the coverage of this exception varied throughout
the period, it apparently always allowed regulation of certain monopolies, such as railroads and public utilities.75 The Court also approved regulation of private land use decisions76 - a setting in
which complex interactions among many persons cause substantial
transaction costs that reduce the plausibility of a bargain and create
significant externalities. In general, the Court avoided any sweeping
preclusion of legislative action. Instead it accompanied the broad
language of "liberty of contract" with a series of distinctions engineered for specific areas and, in the process, validated a substantial
amount of regulation. 77
However, this analysis is basically incomplete. Consistent with
the economic approach, it emphasizes only variation in the effectiveness of the market. While it yields some useful insights, it excludes
consideration of the imperfections in other dominant institutions.
The comparative institutional approach would consider not just the
market, but at least two other alternative decision makers: the legislature and the courts. The issue would not be just whether the mar73. The Court followed its assertion that there were possible grounds for interference with
the liberty to contract with the following comment:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights
and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with tlieir
independence of judgment and of action.
198 U.S. at 57.
The Court subsequently validated legislation that set maximum hours for women in Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This gender distinction is consistent with the traditional common-law rules which viewed women as incapable of contracting.
74. This concept was first articulated in this context in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 122
(1877).
75. For a general discussion of these cases, see B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 155-58 (1942). The monopoly or monopsony effect may also have been
reflected in the Lochner case itself. There the court distinguished Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366 (1898), and Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901). These cases came after the
Allgeyer decision, and allowed legislative interference with the market processes for labor contracting. Holden involved limits on hours and Harbison controlled the manner of compensation. Both cases involved mining and the Courts apparently recognized the prevalence of
company towns - a presumptive instance of monopsony.
It is not the argument here that legislation was the correct solution to the perceived
problems in the market. It is rather that the Court tended to allow the legislature discretion
when it perceived substantial market imperfections.
76. The classic case approving zoning was decided by the Court during the height of the
Lochner era - Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). When it made
this decision, the Court was not totally unaware of the far-reaching nature of the regulation of
private choice in the land use area. The district court's opinion in the case outlined the consequences in great detail and portrayed serious results. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid,
297 F. 307, 309-10 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
77. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 148-99.
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ket worked well or poorly, but also, because legislation would be the
subject of the litigation, whether the legislature worked well or
poorly.
Given the traditional presumption in favor of the democratic
process as a means of determining the public interest, and the important potential role of the democratic process as an indicator of intensity of preference where the market is imperfect, there is good reason
to see a substantial respect for the political process even where the
basic concern is resource allocation efficiency. But, as indicated in
the prior discussion of legislative efficiency,78 strong arguments can
be made that the democratic or political process is itself a highly
imperfect allocator of resources. It is plausible that the Supreme
Court of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was aware
that special interests could distort the political process. From the
butcher's monopoly in the Slaughter-House Cases 19 to the exclusion
of insurance competition in Allgeyer,80 the Court's own docket, as
well as its observation of state legislatures, might easily have indicated that concentrated special interests prevailed to the detriment of
the general populace.
Thus, the economic due process cases might be characterized as
attempts by a Court aware of the imperfections of both the market
and the legislature to set out the conditions under which the flawed
legislature is allowed to take over the responsibilities of the flawed
market. 81
But such a characterization is still basically incomplete. It fails to
recognize the imperfections in the institution which would then have
18. See text at notes 9-17 supra.
79. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394 (1873).
80. See note 68 supra. In this connection, it is instructive to note that one of the early
attempts to find a workable test for judicial invalidation of state legislation under the 14th
amendment occurred in a case involving restrictions on the sale of oleomargarine. Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). Although the Court did not invalidate this legislation,
Justice Harlan's opinion reflects distrust of the legislation as well as reluctance to intervene. It
is not difficult to believe that the Court was aware of the influence of such special interests as
the dairy industry.
81. This balance is reflected in the stances of individual justices. The dissents in Loe/mer
were authored by Justices Harlan and Holmes. However, Justice Harlan had sounded warnings about judicial intervention in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660..61 (1887), and Powell,
and had voted with the majority in Allgeyer. Justice Holmes authored the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). There the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's
attempt to control subsurface coal extraction. At the very least the Court was rejecting the
legislative judgment on the payment of compensation - a position criticized by Justice Brandeis on grounds similar to those in Holmes's own dissent in Lochner. In turn, even Justice
Sutherland supported some significant governmental intervention. He authored the opinion in
Euclid that approved zoning. Using the comparative institutional approach, one would argue
that the Justices all manifested the same institutional balance albeit often with different final
results.
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to decide on this allocation of responsibility: the judiciary itself.
The judiciary is not aided by the "invisible hands" of either market
or political transactions; without the vote of the dollar or the ballot,
it is a highly imperfect determiner of intensity and trade-off. It may
be called upon to enter the breach created by substantial problems
with another institution, but it is not the preferred general determiner of resource allocation (or most other policy goals). Thus, it is
understandable why a Court, faced with two highly imperfect institutions and aware of its own imperfections, constructed a rough
patchwork of traditional distinctions aimed at carving one world for
the market and another for the legislature.
It is now possible to consider the disintegration of this patchwork
in the 1930s and its eventual vilification in the decades that followed.
One might argue that the Court became disenchanted with the market or enamored of the legislature. Such explanations would translate the usual perceptions into institutional terms. But, unless one
believes that the Court viewed voluntary choice as totally impoverished or the legislative process as perfect, these common perceptions
seem insufficient to explain its complete renunciation of economic
due process.
A more plausible explanation is that the Court lost confidence in
the abilities of the judiciary itself. The Court decided that its piecemeal system of review was unworkable - at least on such a broad
scale - and it substantially revised its approach. This revision can
be explained without arguing that the Court had abandoned either
its postulated concern about the allocation of resources or its perception that both the legislative and market processes were highly
imperfect.
The potential for market failures in the real world is enormous.
For example, the problem of lack of knowledge or sophistication captured in the Lochner Court's traditional reference to the suiJuris
status of the coiltracting parties - is present to some degree in almost any economic transaction. The potential for extemality and
even monopoly problems is similarly pervasive. When the Lochnerera Court employed rough categories to define market failure and
the scope of allowable intervention, it might have hoped that they
were workable, narrow categories. But it invited and received assaults on that notion. The famed Brandeis brief and its use in early
Lochner-era cases was the natural outcome of the Court's categories. 82 If th;e Court declares that the legislature shall not decide but
82. The so-called "Brandeis Brief' was first used by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908). It presented social, psychological, and economic information to establish
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does not clearly define the scope of the prohibition, the judiciary
often becomes the substantive policy maker on a case-by-case basis.
. A Court faced with an increasing volume of legislation, and the
increasing complexity of its patchwork categories, 83 might understandably reconsider its approach to legislative scrutiny. The Court
in the 1930s reacted in two seemingly conflicting ways. In the early
part of the decade, it broadened its attacks on legislative attempts to
regulate market choices. 84 By the end of the decade, it had begun
the diminution and eventual virtual extinction of the liberty of contract construct. 85 There are many explanations for the Court's actions, including pressure from the political branches that threatened
the structural integrity of the Court. But the Court's actions are also
consistent with those of a decision maker growing more uneasy with
its own ability to choose between the market and the legislature. Its
reactions can be seen as attempts to remove itself from so central a
role in decision making by more completely allocating responsibility
to one of these other institutions - first to the market, and then to
the legislature.
So general an overview of this complex era omits substantial "realities." The omission is partly the product of the limited scope of
this particular exercise, but it is also a necessary characteristic of any
attempt to organize the mass of reality in a simplifying intellectual
framework.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that legal decisions are best understood
as choices among imperfect institutions. The decision maker is
viewed as assessing the relative imperfections of the alternative institutions, and choosing the one most capable of promoting the desired
societal goal. The Article presented several examples of this comparative institutional approach in both common- and constitutionallaw contexts, and compared it to the economic approach. The economic approach is, in a sense, a special form of the comparative inthe reasonableness of social legislation limiting women's working hours, thereby providing
factual support for the presumption of its constitutionality. See generally Doto, The Brandeis
Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 (19S8).
83. A reading of the opinions in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
reveals a substantial set of distinctions and categories in use just in the employment contract
context.
84. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. S87 (1936); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The last three overturned New Deal programs on
other than due process grounds. The first case was overturned in West Coast Hotel.
BS. See notes 69-70 supra.
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stitutional approach, in which only one institution - the market and one goal - economic efficiency - are considered important. As
this Article demonstrates, even if we assume that the goal is economic efficiency, we need not be limited to a consideration of only
one institution.
The Article did not explore the interaction between institutional
choice and other societal goals. There are several reasons for this.
First, the Article has compared the institutional approach with the
dominant approach to the analysis of the determinants of legal decisions - the economic approach. Because the economic approach
assumes the goal of economic efficiency, that goal was employed in
the discussion. Second, perhaps because no attempts have been
made to offer alternatives to the economic approach that embody
other goals, alternative goals have not been well-defined. I neither
claim nor believe that no other goals guide legal decision making.
But these goals are so loosely defined that, even given an extensive
attempt to define them here, the ensuing institutional analysis would
likely have been overshadowed by controversy about the definition
of the goal. Such an endeavor may well be required, but it is probably better achieved either after alternative goals have been better defined elsewhere, or in the context of a comparative institutional
analysis of a particular area of law.
At this stage, a few general comments about the relation between
societal goals and institutional choice will have to suffice. Whatever
the assumed societal goal, it will require implementation. It will require the application of general pronouncements to a wide variety of
factual settings. It will be applied in a world where uncertainty and
conflict create efforts to influence or manipulate the determination.
Ignorance, complexity, manipulation, and uncertainty will be important, if unfortunate, aspects of implementation. We must, therefore,
consider the imperfections of the institutions that are to implement
the goal. I would not argue that the mix of relevant institutional
attributes will not change with a change in the perceived goal. But
implementation and, therefore, institutional choice are critical features of legal decision making whatever our goal.
At the outset, this Article was described as exploratory. It is a
first step in the creation of an analytical framework built on institutional choice. Little formal information is available about the relative merits of alternative social decision makers. A substantial
amount of insight may be stored in our accumulated intuitions and
unarticulated perceptions. Unfortunately, m~ch intellectual effort
seems expended on the promotion of one institutional configuration
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or another rather than on understanding them. We have seen a continuous cycle of proposed institutional panaceas with the inevitable
result - last gen~ration's savior is this generation's villain. Too
often social critique is little more than the empty revelation of imperfection. However unattractive the image, human institutions are
constrained and limited. The best choice will always be highly imperfect. The important if less dramatic work lies in understanding
the real parameters of choice.
At its core, this Article reflects the basic belief that societal decisions are highly complex and difficult and that this difficulty is reflected in the decision-making process itself. Decisions are
conceived of as struggles in uncertainty rather than confident moves
toward some clearly perceived objective. In the last analysis, a comparative institutional approach is attractive - if at all - because it
captures a basic sense of decision making in an imperfect world.

